

# Chinese APT Groups Target ASEAN Entities

Original report published on: March 26, 2024<sup>[1]</sup>

## Executive Summary

Palo Alto Unit 42 researchers identified and published an advisory in March 2024 highlighting activities and campaigns of Advanced Persistent Threat (“APT”) groups that conduct cyberespionage activities against entities and member countries affiliated with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (“ASEAN”).

Two groups have been identified: Stately Taurus (aka Mustang Panda, BRONZE PRESIDENT, RedDelta, TA416) and an unidentified actor. Both groups pose significant threat due to their potential to exfiltrate sensitive information.

## Background

Two APT groups have been observed targeting ASEAN entities:

- **Stately Taurus:** This group created malware packages aimed at organisations in Myanmar, the Philippines, Japan, and Singapore. The timing suggests a possible connection to the ASEAN-Australia Special Summit held from 4 to 6 March 2024.
- **Second Unidentified Group:** This group compromised an ASEAN-affiliated entity, highlighting their interest in cyber-espionage activities. The researchers identified threat actor activities throughout January and February 2024.

Recent cyberespionage activities against entities and member countries affiliated to ASEAN demonstrated how organisations are targeted to fulfil the mission objective of collecting intelligence of geopolitical interests within the region.

Stately Taurus was observed to have targeted Non-Governmental Organisations (“NGOs”), Think Tanks, and Telecommunications sectors in European and Asian regions based on past campaigns.

## Detection and Mitigation

IMDA recommends organisations in the infocomm and media sectors to perform continual testing and validating of existing security controls to ensure detection and prevention against the MITRE ATT&CK techniques identified in this advisory:

- Deploy a multi-layered protection solution that includes email sandboxing, domain URL filtering, endpoint detection and response protection, and network security measures to detect and block phishing attempts and other threats at various entry points.

- Implement and enforce strong password policies and multi-factor authentication (MFA).
- Deploy data loss prevention solution to monitor that data remains within the enterprise or approved networks.
- Refer to MITRE ATT&CK techniques in this advisory to create detection rules and harden system configuration controls that have no business need. Ensure systems are up to date with the latest security updates.
- Be alert for suspicious emails, particularly those containing phishing attempts or malicious attachment and educate employees on social engineering tactics used by APTs.

IMDA encourages organisations to conduct thorough analysis to identify potential risks and assess potential impacts prior to deploying defensive measures.

### Indicators of Compromise<sup>[1]</sup>

| Malware Hashes - SHA256  | Remarks                  |
|--|--------------------------|
| a16a40d0182a87fc6219693ac664286738329222983bd9e70b455f198e124ba2 | Stately Taurus Campaigns |
| 316541143187acff1404b98659c6d9c8566107bd652310705214777f03ea10c8 |                          |
| 02f4186b532b3e33a5cd6d9a39d9469b8d9c12df7cb45dba6dcab912b03e3cb8 |                          |
| 5cd4003ccaa479734c7f5a01c8ff95891831a29d857757bbd7fe4294f3c5c126 |                          |

| IP Address           | Remarks                   |
|----------------------|---------------------------|
| 103[.]27[.]109[.]157 | Stately Taurus Campaigns  |
| 123[.]253[.]32[.]71  |                           |
| 146[.]70[.]149[.]36  |                           |
| 65[.]20[.]103[.]231  | ASEAN Affiliated Activity |

|                      |  |
|----------------------|--|
| 139[.]59[.]46[.]88   |  |
| 193[.]149[.]129[.]93 |  |
| 192[.]153[.]57[.]98  |  |

| Domain                     | Remarks                         |
|----------------------------|---------------------------------|
| www[.]openservername[.]com | ASEAN<br>Affiliated<br>Activity |
| ai[.]nerdnooks[.]com       |                                 |
| web[.]daydreamdew[.]net    |                                 |

**MITRE ATT&CK Tactics and Techniques**<sup>[2]</sup>

| Tactic               | Technique                        | ID        |
|----------------------|----------------------------------|-----------|
| Reconnaissance       | Spearphishing Link               | T1598.003 |
| Resource Development | Domains                          | T1583.001 |
|                      | Email Accounts                   | T1585.002 |
|                      | Stage Capability: Upload Malware | T1608.001 |
| Initial Access       | Spearphishing Attachment         | T1566.001 |
|                      | Spearphishing Link               | T1566.002 |

|   |  |   |
|---|--|---|
|   | Replication Through Removable Media                      | T1091   |
| Execution   | Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell            | T1059.001   |
|   | Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell | T1059.003   |
|   | Command and Scripting Interpreter: Visual Basic          | T1059.005   |
|   | Exploitation for Client Execution                        | T1203   |
|   | Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task                       | T1053.005   |
|   | User Execution: Malicious Link                           | T1204.001   |
|   | User Execution: Malicious File                           | T1204.002   |
|   | Windows Management Instrumentation                       | T1047   |
|   | Persistence  | Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys/Startup Folder |
| Event Triggered Execution: Windows Management Instrumentation Even Subscription |  | T1546.003   |
| Hijack Execution Flow: DLL Side-Loading   |  | T1547.002   |
| Defence Evasion   | Hide Artifacts: Hidden Files and Directories             | T1564.001   |
|   | Indicator Removal: File Deletion                         | T1070.004   |

|                   |   |            |
|-------------------|---|------------|
|                   | Masquerading: Match Legitimate Name or Location   | T1036.005  |
|                   | Masquerading: Double File Extension               | T1036.007  |
|                   | Obfuscated Files or Information: Binary Padding   | T1027.001  |
|                   | System Binary Proxy: InstallUtil                  | T1218.004  |
|                   | System Binary Proxy: Mshta                        | T1218.005  |
| Credential Access | OS Credential Dumping: NTDS                       | T1003.003  |
| Discovery         | File and Directory Discovery                      | T1083      |
|                   | Process Discovery                                 | T1057      |
|                   | Software Discovery                                | T1518      |
|                   | System Information Discovery                      | T1082      |
|                   | System Network Configuration Discovery            | T1016      |
|                   | System Network Connections Discovery              | T1049      |
| Collection        | Automated Collection                              | T1119      |
|                   | Archive Collected Data: Archive via Utility       | T1560.003  |
|                   | Archive Collected Data: Archive via Custom Method | T1560.001  |
|                   | Data Staged: Local Data Staging                   | T1074.001  |
|                   | Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols         | TT1071.001 |

|                     |  |           |
|---------------------|--|-----------|
| Command and Control | Encrypted Channel: Symmetric Cryptography                | T1573.001 |
|                     | Ingress Tool Transfer                                    | T1105     |
|                     | Remote Access Software                                   | T1219     |
|                     | Web Service  | T1102     |
| Exfiltration        | Exfiltration Over Physical Medium: Exfiltration over USB | T1052.001 |

## References

1. ^ [“ASEAN Entities in the Spotlight: Chinese APT Group Targeting”](#) .
2. ^ [“Mustang Panda - MITRE”](#) .