Case Reference	R/E/I/138
Title	StarHub's Service Difficulty Incident on 17 September 2019 ("Incident")
Case Opened	17 September 2019
Case Closed	27 May 2020
Complainant	IMDA initiated this proceeding pursuant to the Code of Practice for Telecommunication Service Resiliency 2016 ("Code")
Respondent	StarHub Ltd (referred herein as "StarHub")
Case Summary	On 17 September 2019, a disruption to StarHub's Internet Lease Line ("ILL") services affected up to 852 of StarHub's corporate subscribers, from 1805 hrs. Services were progressively restored from 1815 hrs to 2150 hrs.  The cause of the Incident was attributed to an error committed by a StarHub engineer during the provisioning of a new ILL for a corporate customer. The error caused a large number of routes to be introduced in StarHub's Internet Exchange network and impacted a small amount of the network equipment used to
	provide ILL services.
IMDA's Determination	IMDA's investigation concluded that the error was made after the StarHub engineer had mistakenly assumed that there was a missing command in the Method of Procedure for the activity and added an erroneous command to the provisioning system, which resulted in the incident.  Accordingly, IMDA determined that the Incident could have been prevented if StarHub had ensured that there was adequate supervision on the provisioning work conducted by its engineers,
	e.g., conducting secondary checks on command changes before execution.
	IMDA noted that StarHub had i) given prompt communication to the affected subscribers during the Incident; ii) rendered full cooperation to IMDA for the investigation of the Incident; and iii) taken measures to automate its provisioning process to prevent a recurrence. Taking all these mitigating factors into consideration,

	IMDA decided to impose a financial penalty of \$32,000 on
	StarHub for the Incident.